Effects of the CDM on Poverty Eradication and Global Climate Protection by Dirk T.G. Rübbelke & Nathan Rive
This paper can be downloaded without charge at: 
 
The Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei Note di Lavoro Series Index: 
http://www.feem.it/Feem/Pub/Publications/WPapers/default.htm 
  









The opinions expressed in this paper do not necessarily reflect the position of 
Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei 





Effects of the CDM on Poverty 
Eradication and Global Climate 
Protection 
Dirk T.G. Rübbelke and Nathan Rive 














CCMP – Climate Change Modelling and Policy 
 
 
Dirk T.G. Rübbelke and Nathan Rive, Center for International Climate and  















In an impure public good model we analyze the effects of CDM transfers on poverty as 
well as on the global climate protection level. We construct an analytical model of a 
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utility – a function of private consumption, domestic air quality, and global climate 
protection. They do so by distributing their finite expenditures across (1) the aggregate 
consumption good, (2) end-of-pipe pollution control technologies, and (3) greenhouse gas 
abatement. Based on our analytical findings, we develop two sets of simulations for 
China in which we vary the rate of the CDM transfer. The simulations differ by the 
assumption of China’s domestic air quality policy – the first assumes a technology-
standards policy which fixes a level of end-of-pipe SO2 control, whereas the second 
assumes a technology-neutral policy which simply fixes the level of total SO2 
emissions.  
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1    Introduction 
The Kyoto Protocol does not prescribe greenhouse gas (GHG) reductions to developing 
countries. This fact is employed by opponents to the Kyoto Protocol to stress its ineffi-
ciency, since GHG emission mitigation options can regularly be exploited more cheaply 
in the developing world. The US which refused to join the Protocol claims for partici-
pation of developing countries in international GHG emission reduction efforts. This 
claim is rejected by the developing world because of the economic burden which such 
efforts  would  imply.  Furthermore,  developing  countries  argue  that  the  industrialized 
world is mainly responsible for the current dimension of the global warming threat. 
Therefore, it should mainly be the industrialized world‟s responsibility to combat glob-
al warming. 
Yet, the Kyoto Protocol integrates a mechanism which addresses both opponent views. 
This  mechanism,  the  Clean  Development  Mechanism  (CDM),  allows  industrialized 
countries to fulfill their GHG abatement obligations partly by mitigating GHG emis-
sions in developing countries, where mitigation options can be exploited in a cheaper 
way. The CDM-associated costs of climate protection are borne by the industrialized 
world.  
“With the already huge and growing amount of greenhouse gas emissions and a great 
deal of low-cost abatement options available, China is widely expected as the world‟s 
number one host country of CDM projects” (Zhang 2006). According to Zhang (2000), 
about 60 percent of the total CDM flows in 2010 will go to China. Vennemo et al. (2006) 
review various studies assessing the total CDM potential in China and find that the high-
est CDM-potential estimate is 788 Mt CO2 (based on the assessments by Zhang (1999, 
2000)). Therefore, in our analysis we focus on the case where China is the host of CDM 
projects, which are initiated by the largest purchaser of CDM credits, i.e. Europe. 
The CDM requires that corresponding GHG reductions in the developing world would 
not have occurred in the absence of respective emission mitigation policies, i.e. measures 
should be additional.  
As Dutschke and Michaelowa (2003) point out, there are disputes about the interpretation  
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of „additionality‟.
1 In our model, we consider additionality in the way that industrialized 
countries pay for an environmental protection technology shift which raises the level of 
climate protection. Only the funding of the shift is of interest, not the total funding of the 
applied technology, since only the shift is additional. Therefore, the CDM efforts are 
represented by subsidization of a climate-friendly technology which would not have been 
applied otherwise. More precisely, we consider the shift from technologies exclusively ge-
nerating local/regional environmental benefits to technologies producing local/regional as 
well as global environmental benefits. In our analysis we consider climate policy to be 
an impure public good. 
The analysis is organized as follows. In Section 2, we consider effects of transfers, i.e. 
income and price effects. The latter can only be induced by means of conditional trans-
fers, like CDM transfers.  
In Section 3, we explain in detail why climate policy is an impure public good. We de-
scribe the different groups of benefits generated by climate policy, i.e. primary and an-
cillary benefits. Primary benefits are derived from the pursuit of the primary aim tar-
geted by climate policy, which is climate protection. Ancillary benefits in turn are re-
ceived from joint effects which were not primarily intended. Such an effect would be the 
mitigation of local air pollution which is induced by the climate protection measure. 
Because primary benefits are global while ancillary benefits are local or regional, cli-
mate policy is an impure public good. Thereafter, we provide a survey of ancillary bene-
fit studies in developing countries.  
In Section 4, we develop an analytical model which indicates that there is scope for rais-
ing the global climate protection level by means of CDM transfers. The crucial prerequi-
sites for such climate policy level increasing transfers are determined. There may also be 
a positive effect of CDM transfers on poverty reduction in the developing world, whose 
magnitude depends on the level of transfers received.  
In Section 5, we present a simulation model in order to analyze the effect of the choice of 
the subsidy rate (or its level) on welfare and poverty (private good consumption) in the de-
veloping world. Here, the industrialized world is represented by Europe and the develop-
                                                            
1 Dutschke and Michaelowa (2003) stress that financial additionality requires that no public money 
that would have been spent anyway to climate -related action in the developing world is relabelled as 
CDM effort.  
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ing world by China. Furthermore, we analyze which effect the level of the subsidy rate 
has on the global climate protection level. In the simulation model, we distinguish two 
policy scenarios in China. One scenario depicts a flexible and incentive-compatible envi-
ronmental policy in China, while the other considers a more rigid scheme where technol-
ogy standards are set by the environmental policy. In this model, the rigidity of standards-
based environmental regulations will have negative consequences for the Chinese private 
consumption level.    
Section 6 concludes. 
 
2    The Possible Impacts of Transfers on Climate Protec-
tion Levels 
Climate policy is often simply regarded as a pure public good, since nobody can be 
excluded from the consumption of climate protection and this consumption exhibits non-
rivalry. As Warr (1982, 1983) demonstrates for the case of pure public goods, uncondi-
tional transfers have no effect on the public good provision level, or more precisely, in 
an interior Nash equilibrium, redistribution of income among agents is neutral. Income 
transfers are called neutral if they do neither affect the total public good provision nor 
the individual agents‟ consumption of private goods. Prior to this, the neutrality result 
had already been noticed by Becker (1974). 
Kemp (1984) extends Warr‟s „neutrality theorem‟ to the case of more than one public 
good. Boadway, Pestieau and Wildasin (1989) point out that transfers may be neutral 
even when there are distortions in the shape of taxes and subsidies on private goods or 
factors, strictly local public goods, or on goods that are public to all. Varian (1994) 
finds that neutrality may also occur for Stackelberg equilibria. These results suggest that 
unconditional income transfers would only cause a redistribution of climate protection ac-
tivities among countries while leaving the global abatement level, as well as the individual 
countries‟ welfare, unchanged. Therefore, incentives for development aid in the shape of 
unconditional transfers would not exist. 
Yet, neutrality may break, if we consider that there exist cost differentials in the production 
of public goods (Buchholz and Konrad 1995: 496) like climate policy, corner solutions 
(Bergstrom, Blume and Varian 1986), non-zero conjectures (Sandler and Posnett 1991) and  
5  5 
impure publicness (Andreoni 1986, 1989, 1990). However, the positive impact of uncondi-
tional transfers channeled towards developing countries, i.e. of alleviating poverty in the 
developing world, on the provision level of the global public good „climate policy‟ tends to 
be quite weak (Rübbelke 2002). 
Therefore, conditional transfers, i.e. payments not only inducing an income effect, tend 
to be more attractive. Transfers which are provided conditionally on climate policy ef-
forts in the transfer receptor countries additionally generate a price effect by reducing 
the effective price of climate policy from the transfer-receiving countries‟ point of view. 
Due to the effective price reduction, the production of climate policy becomes more 
attractive in these countries. This kind of transfers is in the focus of our paper and is 
represented by CDM transfers channeled to the developing world.  
Yet, in contrast to many other studies analyzing conditional transfers, our starting point 
(before transfers are paid) is a corner solution. By means of conditional transfers, the 
climate-protecting countries intend to convince the free-riding nations to participate in 
the international climate protection efforts. Hence, we have a starting point similar to 
the current Kyoto-situation, where most industrialized countries commit to climate pro-
tection, while developing countries are not at all obligated to control their greenhouse gas 
(GHG) emissions. 
3    Climate Policy Considered as an Impure Public Good 
CDM transfers (if chosen sufficiently high) may induce an increase in private consump-
tion in the receptor country and they simultaneously initiate climate protection measures 
conducted by the recipient (see Figure 1). Climate protection measures in turn, provide 
pure public as well as private (from an individual country‟s point of view) characteris-
tics. Consequently, they can be considered as impure public goods. In the subsequent 
sections, individual countries‟ decisions on climate policy production will be analyzed in 
an impure public good model.  
3.1    Characteristics of Climate Policy 
The pure public characteristic subsumes the climate-change mitigating effects or the cli-
mate protection generated by climate policy. The benefits derived from these effects can be  
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enjoyed globally, irrespective of which country abates greenhouse gas emissions. No 
country can be excluded from the consumption of climate protection and non-rivalry 
in consumption prevails. The benefits resulting from climate protection are called pri-
mary benefits of climate policy. 
Climate policy also provides some private characteristic with purely local/regional 
influence that can be exclusively enjoyed by countries/regions generating climate policy. 
So, the reduction of combustion processes also causes a decline in the emissions of lo-
cal/regional air pollutants like particulates, NOX and SO2. This decline represents a 
domestic public good for the inhabitants of the considered country. From the point of 
view of the country or region as a whole, the characteristic is private, since the asso-
ciated benefits are exclusively enjoyed in this country or region. The benefits which 
countries enjoy from consuming the domestic public characteristic are the ancillary or 
secondary benefits. 
Yet, we have to take account of the fact that the ancillary benefits can also be generat-
ed independently of climate policy. Desulphurization installations, for example, re-
duce the emission of SO2 independently of climate policy. So, the higher the level of 
such installations, the lower will be the (marginal) ancillary benefits of climate policy. 
 






pure public characteristic: 
reduction of CO2 emissions 
domestic public (private) characteristic: 
e.g. reduction of SO2 emissions 
primary benefits  ancillary benefits  
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Furthermore, as Rypdal et al. (2005) point out, there are greenhouse gases which are 
not included in the Kyoto Protocol, that generate more regionally confined climate 
effects. Hence, the abatement of these gases cannot fully be regarded as a global pure 
public good. 
On the other hand there exist ancillary benefits that are global. The abatement of the 
greenhouse  gases  CFCs  generates  an  important  ancillary  benefit  by  protecting  the 
ozone layer (Rübbelke 2002: 23). However, throughout we will suppose primary bene-
fits to be global, while ancillary benefits are local or regional.  
 
3.2    Ancillary Benefits in Developing Countries 
While in the 1990s the focus of studies investigating ancillary benefits was on those 
occurring in industrialized countries, meanwhile a large strand of literature exists that 
deals with ancillary benefits in developing countries.
2 This subsection provides a short 
survey of this literature on ancillary benefits in the developing world.  
As can be observed from Table 1, the geographical foci of these studies are heteroge-
neous although most of them address co-benefits in China. Yet, even the studies for 
China have different regional perspectives with diverging results. The analysis by Gie-
len and Chen (2001) considers Shanghai and it shows that the relevance of no-regret 
options - due to ancillary benefits derived from NOX and SO2 emission reductions - is 
limited because of significant energy efficiency improvements in Shanghai in recent 
years. However, the authors admit that Shanghai seems not to be representative for the 
whole of China and that main GHG emission mitigation potential may be located in 
the rural areas of China. Nevertheless, in their assessment of ancillary benefits asso-
ciated with a reduced PM10 emission level, Kan et al. (2004) find results for Shanghai 
which illustrate that an effective energy and environmental policy will play an active 
role in the reduction of air pollution and the promotion of public health. Aunan et al. 
(2004) focus on co-benefits in Shanxi and assess that CO2-reducing abatement options 
entail large co-benefits and are highly profitable in a socio-economic sense. Aunan et 
al. (2007: 472) argue that a climate protection commitment would provide significant 
                                                            
2 Still the literature on the qualitative implications of ancillary benefits (in contrast to the literature only 
assessing those benefits‟ size) is small. Among the few exceptions are Lutter and Shogren (2002) who 
analyze how these benefits affect emissions permit trading.      
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ancillary benefits to China, since climate protection efforts will not only cause a reduc-
tion in GHG emissions but also reductions in particles- and NOX-emissions. These 
(and other) non-GHG-emission reductions – in turn – will not only improve public 
health but will additionally increase agricultural yields. Van Vuuren et al. (2003) also 
assess that large co-benefits of climate protection by means of energy efficiency im-
provement prevail in China.  
 
Study  Country  Pollutants  
(local/regional) 
Model/Approach 
Aunan et al. 
(2003) 
China  PM, SO2, TSP  comparison of studies that comprise 
a bottom-up study, a semi-bottom-up 
study and a top down study using a 
CGE model 
Aunan et al. 
(2004) 
China  SO2, Particles  analysis and comparison of six dif-
ferent CO2-abating options  
Aunan et al. 
(2007) 




India  NOX, Particulates, 
SO2 
CGE model 





China  NOX, Particulates, 
SO2 
integrated modelling approach com-
bining a top-down recursive dynam-
ic  CGE  model  with  a  bottom-up 
electricity sector model 
Chen et al. 
(2007) 
China    comparison  of  partial  and  general 
equilibrium MARKAL models 
Cifuentes et 
al. (2000) 






Ozone, Particulates  development  of  scenarios  that  esti-
mate  the  cumulative  public  health 
impacts of reducing GHG emissions 
Dadi et al. 
(2000) 




Chile  CO, Lead, NO2, 




Nepal  CO, HC, NOX, SO2, 
Particles, Lead 












China  PM, SO2  CGE model  
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Gielen, Chen 
(2001) 
China  NOX, SO2  MARKAL,  technology  asses sment 
and alternative policy scenarios 
Ho, Nielsen 
(2007) 
China  SO2, TSP  CGE model 
Kan et al. 
(2004) 
China  Particulates  Shanghai MARKAL model 
Larson et al. 
(2003) 
China  SO2  MARKAL of energy sector; base vs. 
advanced  technology  scena rios  for 
controlling CO2 and SO2 
Li (2006)  Thailand  Particulates  dynamic recursive CGE model 
McKinley et 
al. (2005) 
Mexico  CO, HC, NOX, Par-
ticulates, SO2 
analysis  of  five  pollution  control 
options in Mexico City 
Mestl et al. 
(2005) 





China  SO2  survey  of  recent  banning  of  coal 
burning  in  small  boilers  in  dow n-
town area of Taiyuan 
O‟Connor et 
al. (2003) 
China  NOX, SO2, TSP  CGE model 
Peng (2000)  China  Particulates, SO2  RAINS-Asia  for  local,  and  GTAP 




Thailand  NOX, SO2  four scenarios, use of end-use based 




China    sample calculations regarding inter-
ventions  in  the  household  energy 
sector 
Van Vuuren 
et al. (2003) 
China  SO2  simulation model 
Vennemo et 
al. (2006) 
China  SO2, TSP  synthesis of a significant body of 
research on co-benefits of climate 
policy in China 
Wang, Smith 
(1999a,b) 
China  Particulates, SO2  no economic modelling 
West et al. 
(2004) 
Mexico  CO, HC, NOX, Par-
ticulates, SO2 
linear programming model 
Table 1: Ancillary Benefit Studies Regarding Developing Countries.  
 
However, not only the geographical foci of studies differ but also the considered non-
CO2 pollutants and the employed methodologies. Many studies assess co-benefits as-
sociated with the mitigation of SO2 and particles reductions. Also, NOX is frequently 
included in the analyses. Yet, in their CGE study for Chile, Dessus and O‟Connor 
(2003) gather a larger basket of pollutants, which includes CO, Lead, NO2, Ozone, 
PM, SO2. In strong contrast, in their study regarding China, Larson et al. (2003) only  
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investigate ancillary benefits of SO2 mitigation. However, they provide an integrated 
analysis and not just a co-benefit assessment. In their analyses dealing with ancillary 
effects in the transport sectors in Mexico City and Santiago de Chile, Eskeland and 
Xie (1998) provide technology and cost-curve assessments. Cifuentes et al. (2000) do 
not apply an economic model, but conduct an aggregate analysis to estimate potential 
ancillary benefits in Chile. A CGE model is used by Bussolo and O‟Connor (2001) in 
order to investigate ancillary benefits in India. Their study estimates the magnitude of 
spillovers from limiting growth of greenhouse gas emissions to local air quality and 
the health of the urban population. 
O‟Connor (2000) provides another comparison of different ancillary benefit studies for 
developing countries. Ancillary benefits may however be different to those associated 
with the mitigation of air pollution. As Sagar (2005) points out climate policy may 
contribute immense social-economic benefits to the world‟s poor, while Campbell-
Lendrum and Corvalán (2007) stress the implications of climate policy for both, envi-
ronmental health and equity.  
 
4    Analytical Model 
4.1    Countries‟ Consumption of Goods 
In our model we distinguish between the industrialized and the developing world. The 
individual countries belonging to the industrialized or developing world may consume 
commodities which have a private good character from each country‟s individual point 
of view, as well as a commodity which also provides benefits to all the other countries, 
i.e., the global public good „climate policy‟. It is supposed that climate policy‟s private 
or domestic public characteristic can also be generated independently of the public 
characteristic. Countries can consume the following commodities: 
Private commodity: Each country group produces an amount y of a marketed goods 
bundle whose characteristic is private to each of them (first private characteristic). 
Each unit of this marketed private good provides one unit of the good‟s characteristic, 
so that y denotes the amount of the private commodity as well as the amount of the 
private characteristic generated by this commodity.  
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Domestic public commodity: Furthermore, each country generates an amount a of a 
second commodity (e.g., desulphurisation installation) that is a domestic public good, 
i.e., a good whose characteristic (e.g., local air quality improvements) is private to the 
consuming country (second private characteristic). Each unit of this domestic public 
good provides one unit of its „private‟ or domestic public characteristic. 
Impure public commodity: The third commodity is an impure public good (climate 
policy)  providing  the  private  characteristic  (e.g.,  local  air  quality  improvements) 
which is also produced by the second commodity. It is consumed up to an amount q 
and each unit of the public good generates   units of the private characteristic. There-
fore, the total amount of the private characteristic is  q a z , where  q is the ancil-
lary effect - such as the reduction in conventional air pollution - associated with cli-
mate policy. Furthermore, the impure public good provides a characteristic (climate 
protection) which is public to all countries. Each unit of the public good generates   
units of the public characteristic. The total amount X of the public characteristic is 
equal to the sum of the developing  ) x ( d  and the industrialized  ) x ( i  country groups‟ 
provision. 
 
  Industrialized Country  Developinq Country  Unit Costs 





Private good 2 or 
local (domestic) 
public good 
ai  ad  a
i p  or 
a
d p  
Impure (global) public 
good 
qi  qd  q
i p  or
q
d p   
Total domestic public 
good (env) benefit 
zi = ai +  i iq   zd = ad +  d dq    
Climate benefit  xi = ßiqi  xd = ßdqd   
Aggregate (global) climate benefit     X = xi + xd 
 = private benefit produced per unit of the impure public good, q, produced 
 = (global) public benefit produced per unit of impure public good, q, produced 
s = subsidy rate, the rate at which the industrialized country subsidizes the produc-
tion of the impure public good in the developing country 
Table 2: Notations. 
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For simplicity, we aggregate the individual countries by assigning them to one of the 
country groups, i.e. the developing or industrialized country group. The private com-
modity has the unit price p
y. The domestic public good has the unit costs of p
a(a) and 
the impure public good has unit costs of p
q(q), both of which are functions of their 
respective abatement levels. The characteristics are assumed to behave like normal 
goods. The parameters which differ in size among countries get an index, where the 
index d stands for „developing world‟ and i indicates the „industrialized world‟. For 
simplicity, we apply ßi = ßd = 1. 
4.2    The Developing World‟s Maximization Problem 
The welfare in both country groups is assumed to depend on the consumption of the 
private and public characteristics. Yet, we assume that a corner solution in internation-
al climate protection prevails, where the developing world does not contribute to cli-
mate policy, i.e., i x X = . This results from a climate policy level in the industrialized 
world which provides climate protection in excess of the level demanded by the poorer 
developing countries. As Gielen and Chen (2001: 258) stress the order of issues on the 
political agenda in developing countries like China is: “First the apparent local air pol-
lution problems are tackled; next the more distant GHG problem is considered. There-
fore, it is more relevant to study the impact of local air pollution abatement on GHG 
emission reduction than vice versa.” 
In the maximization of the country groups‟ welfare, we apply the Nash assumption 
that each  group considers the other group‟s public good/characteristic provision as 
being given.  









d . This assumption is in line with the 
findings by Gielen and Chen (2001: 267). In their conclusions they point out concern-
ing the options of GHG abatement measures with local air pollution co-effects on the one 
hand side and local air pollution mitigation measures (without or with limited GHG 
benefits) on the other hand side: “The results suggest that dedicated emission abatement 
technology (without or with limited GHG benefits) is a more cost-effective way to re-
duce local air pollution. Examples are 3-way catalysts for cars and IGCC for electricity 
production. Such technologies should be considered if secondary benefits are valued”.   
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From this starting point, we then assume that the industrialized world offers the devel-
oping world a conditional transfer, i.e. it offers to subsidize the developing world‟s 
production of the impure public good.  
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Id represents the developing country‟s national income. The bars above I and p
y indi-
cate that they are fixed in our model. The rate s is calibrated on initial levels of p
q, p
a, 
q, and a, and is also fixed. 
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The variable λ can be interpreted as the shadow price of the income constraint. 
4.3    The Industrialized World‟s Maximization Problem 
The industrialized country faces no public characteristic provision in excess of its de-
mand. The maximization problem of the industrialized world is given by: 
                                                            
3 We suppose that the developing world disregards the public characteristic in its reasoning. This is due 
to the assumptions that the industrialized world provides – throughout – this characteristics in excess of 
the developing world‟s demand and that the developing world takes xi as given. See Rübbelke (2006) 
for a similar approach.  
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4.4    Conditions for the Acceptance of Transfers 
Each region has its own demands regarding the acceptability of CDM activity; this can 
be seen in equations (5) and (11). The industrial region will accept the CDM as long as 
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In equilibrium, only one of the Kuhn-Tucker conditions related to qd shall be binding, 
and the lowest acceptable level of s will prevail. This is generally associated with the 
developing region‟s condition. As such, we drop the industrialized region‟s Kuhn-
Tucker condition related to qd (equation (11)), and replace it with equation (12). The 
combination of equations (5) and (12) ensures that both regions are satisfied with the 
CDM subsidy arrangement. 
5    Simulation Model 
Conditional transfers may improve the outcome: developing countries may enjoy a 
higher regional environmental quality and both, industrialized and developing coun-
tries may enjoy a mitigation of the global warming threat. The effect on poverty reduc-
tion, i.e. increase in private consumption, in the developing world crucially depends on 
the level of transfers received. Part of these transfers may not be conditionally em-
ployed and could be used by the developing world for additional consumption of the 
private good D y . In order to analyze the effect of the level of the subsidy rate on po-
verty or private good consumption in the developing world, we conduct a simulation 
study. We also analyze the effects of changing transfer rates on global climate protec-
tion and local/regional air quality levels. 
5.1  European Funds Transferred to China 
We apply the theoretical framework to a simulation model based around empirical 
data. For this illustrative example, we focus on CDM transfers between Europe
4  (the 
largest purchaser of CDM credits) and China (the largest provider of CDM cre dits), 
and the impact on SO2 emissions in both regions in 2010. Europe and China take the 
roles as developed and developing regions respectively, although we also account for 
CO2-reducing measures in the rest of the world. 
Functional Forms 
It is assumed that our regions have utility functions of the form: 
X z y U i i i i i i ln ln ln 3 2 1   (14) 
                                                            
4 European Union plus Norway, Iceland, Liechtenstein, and Switzerland.  
16  16 
d d d d d z y U ln ln 2 1    (15) 
In addition, the average price functions are assumed to take the following form (using 
a
d p  as an example): 
C Ba Aa a p d d d
a
d
2 ) (  
 (16) 
The coefficients are determined for each price function using region-specific data de-
scribed below. 
Empirical Data 
We assemble appropriate consumption and abatement data in order to obtain initial 
values and to calibrate our model. A key source is the CICERO GRACE model (Aa-
heim and Rive 2005), which is aggregated to include China, Europe, and the Rest of 
World. The business as usual (BAU) GRACE scenario broadly follows the SRES B2 
(IPCC 2000) scenario to 2010. 
The initial budget constraint (I) is taken from the BAU GRACE scenario. 
 
Region  Budget 2010 (Trillion $) 
Europe  20 
China  6.36 
Table 3: Budgets. 
 
The GRACE model is also used to obtain the marginal abatement cost (MAC) curve 
for CO2 abatement in Europe. This marginal abatement curve is obtained by calculat-
ing the permit price and abatement quantities for increasingly stringent CO2 reduction 
targets, as is done by Ellerman and Decaux (1998), within the current group of EU-
ETS (emissions trading scheme) sectors.
5 
The marginal abatement cost curve for China is not calculated in the GRACE model, 
as the model does not reflect the transaction and uncertainty costs involved with 
CDM-type projects. As such, a simplistic linear MAC curve is assumed for the CDM 
transfers between China and Europe, using the $7 -14/tCO2 range of CER prices in 
recent years. 
The marginal abatement costs for SO2 abatement are calculated from separate models, 
                                                            
5 The sectors are: power plants, cement, paper and pulp, iron and steel, and oil refining.  
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as GRACE does not feature treatment for emissions control technologies. MAC curves 
for  SO2  abatement  in  Europe  and  China  are  calculated  using  the  RAINS-Online 
(Amann et al. 2004) and GAINS-Asia (Klaassen et al. 2006) models respectively. The 
MAC curves are for the year 2010, for „current legislation‟ (CLE) assumptions about 
pollution control and moderate economic growth. 
These four MAC curves are converted into average abatement cost curves, characte-
rized by the coefficients  as  per  equation  (16).  The coefficients for each curve  are 
shown in Table 4 below, with the average prices given in $/tSO2 or $/tCO2 abated, 
under abatement levels denominated in MtSO2 or MtCO2. 
 
Curve/Coefficient  A  B  C 
Europe CO2  0  0.0467  1.06 
Europe SO2  57.4  -450  1140 
China CO2  0  0.0989  7.0 
China SO2  0.268  -27.4  765 
Table 4: Coefficients. 
 
Calibrating the model for European and Chinese CO2 and SO2 abatement, of course, 
depends on assumptions about climate policy (i.e. the Kyoto Protocol), air quality pol-
icy, and how Europe‟s CO2 reductions are distributed between domestic and CDM 
abatement. Initial SO2 abatement levels in Europe and China are taken from the CLE 
abatement levels in the RAINS-Online and GAINS-Asia, using the „no control‟ levels 
as a starting point. In order to meet its Kyoto target, Europe must reduce its CO2 emis-
sions from the GRACE BAU 2010 level by 8.5% or 326 MtCO2.
6 If we assume that all 
domestic abatement will be undertaken within the EU-ETS sectors, and future alloca-
tions will keep the domestic permit price to 20 $/tCO 2, the GRACE MAC curve sug-
gests that only 203 MtCO2 of this will be abated at home. This leaves a shortfall of 
123 MtCO2 that must come from CDM credits. At face value, this appears to be a rea-
sonable assumption given that the UNEP CDM Pipeline database predicts 300 MtCO2 
of CDM credits will be available in 2010 (Fenhann 2008). 
Yet China and Europe are involved in numerous CDM transactions, and not all of 
them are of particular interest here. In this paper, we are primarily interested in CDM 
transactions  between  the  two  regions  related  to  combustion-based  CO2  emissions. 
                                                            
6 Assuming all Eastern European hot air is allowed.  
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However, Europe will likely purchase credits from F-gas and N2O projects in China, 
and it will also likely buy credits from other regions at the same time. In addition, 
China will likely be selling credits to other regions. Of course, it is impossible to pre-
dict the distribution of project types in Europe‟s and China‟s transactions. As such, we 
simply assume that it simply follows the broad distribution of projects already featured 
in the CDM projects that are registered and under validation. We take these additional 
transaction expenditures into account by adding them as fixed parameters into Eu-
rope‟s and China‟s budget constraints (equations (2) and (7) above). 
Finally, we must account for climate policy in the other Annex B countries having 
ratified the Kyoto Protocol such as Canada, New Zealand, Australia, Russia, and Ja-
pan.  These  countries  will  also  reduce  their  emissions  via  a  mix  of  domestic  and 
CDM/JI abatement measures. Their abatement is included in the model as a fixed pa-
rameter contributing to the total CO2 abatement level X. 
These parameters are presented below in Table 5. 
 
Initial Abatement (2010)  MtSO2 or MtCO2 
SO2 Targets   
Europe  7.3 
China  100 
   
Kyoto Targets   
Europe  326 
Other Annex B  380 
   
Europe CER Purchases   
Combustion CDM from China  36 
All other CERs  87 
   
China CER Sales   
Combustion CDM to Europe  36 
All other CERs  120 
Table 5: Fixed Parameters. 
 
The initial marginal costs of abatement are presented below in Table 6. 
 
Parameter [units]  Europe  China 
p
a [$/tSO2]  3750  3300 
p
q [$/tCO2]  20  14 
Table 6: Marginal Abatement Costs. 
 
The alpha (α) variable in the model represents the rate at which SO2 is reduced jointly 
with CO2 reduction. The European value is taken from a previous paper by Löschel  
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and Rübbelke (2009), whereas the China value is taken from unpublished calculations 
undertaken by the authors. 
 
Alpha (α)  kgSO2/tCO2 abated 
EU-17  1 
China  3 
Table 7: Values for α. 
 
The final step of the calibration is to calculate the initial consumption (y) levels, and 
the subsidy rate for CDM expenditures. These are shown below in Table 8. 
 
Parameter  Initial Value 
Europe Consumption (Trillion $)  20 
China Consumption (Trillion $)  6.29 
Subsidy rate (s)  0.29 
Table 8: Initial Consumption Levels and the Subsidy Rate. 
 
5.2  Simulation Results 
By our model, we assess the impact of the subsidy rate (s) paid by Europe for combus-
tion CO2-based CDM projects in China on utility, consumption, emissions control, and 
prices. We undertake two sets of simulations, within both of which we incrementally 
vary the level of s. Each set differs, however, in how China is assumed to achieve its 
domestic SO2  goals.  The first  simulation  set  is assumed to  be  technology-specific, 
keeping the use of end-of-pipe technologies (a) fixed. The second set, however, is 
technology-neutral, and merely keeps the total level of SO2 emissions (z) constant. 
Our interest is how these approaches may impact our results. The results are presented 
in Figures 2 and 3 below. It is seen that, as expected, the level of global CO2 abate-
ment (X) increases with an increased subsidy under both simulations.  
Under both simulations, the level of utility in China rises with increasing subsidy rates. 
The sign of the impact of rising subsidy rates on consumption depends acutely on the 
policy approach assumed for air quality in China. Under a standards-driven policy, 
where end-of-pipe abatement technology usage is fixed, consumption actually falls 
under  increased  CDM  subsidy  rates.  The  opposite  is  the  case  for  the  technology-
neutral policy.  



















































































Subsidy (s) level relative to the baseline level
y (China, left axis))
u (China, left axis)
q (China, right axis)
X (right axis)
 
Figure 2: Change in global CO2 reduction (x), and consumption (y), utility (u), and 
CO2  emissions  abatement  in  China  (q)  under  changes  to  the  CDM  subsidy  level. 

















































































Subsidy (s) level relative to the baseline level
y (China, left axis)
u (China, left axis)
q (China, right axis)
z (China, right axis)
X (right axis)
 
Figure 3: Change in global CO2 reduction (x), and consumption (y), utility (u), and 
CO2 (q) and SO2 (z) emission abatement in China under changes to the CDM subsidy 
level. Technology-standards-driven domestic air quality policy assumed. 
 
The reason for this is that under the standards-driven policy, China does not have the 
flexibility to take advantage of the air quality co-benefits of the CDM and substitute 
between end-of-pipe and CDM contributions to SO2 reductions. Under the technology-
neutral policy (where only the level of SO2 emissions is mandated) and higher CDM 
subsidies, China can reduce its expenditures on end-of-pipe technologies – affording it 
higher levels of consumption. This result is in line with much of the market-based en-
vironmental policy literature in the recent decades. To take maximal advantage of the 
co-benefits of CDM, a flexible technology-neutral air quality policy (such as emis- 
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sions trading or taxes) is thus advisable. 
6    Concluding Remarks 
 
The importance of environmental sustainability for poverty mitigation is frequently 
stressed. The seventh UN Millennium Development Goal, for example, calls for the 
integration of the principles of sustainable development into country policies and pro-
grammes and to reverse the loss of environmental resources. Such a strategy of linking 
two policy issues, i.e. environmental protection and poverty eradication, is considered 
in this paper. However, we not only consider the impact of an improved environment 
on the welfare of poor countries, but also the effects of international environmental 
measures on private consumption in developing countries. Increases in welfare and 
private consumption levels can both be regarded as a mitigation of poverty. 
The  international  protection  measures  analyzed  here  are  CDM  transfers  channeled 
from the industrialized to the developing world. More precisely, we investigated the 
influence of transfers from Europe, which is currently the largest purchaser of CDM 
credits, towards China, which is the largest provider of CDM credits, on changing the 
technology application in China. We observed the effects on poverty (welfare and pri-
vate consumption levels) in China as well as on China‟s and the whole world‟s climate 
protection levels. 
The results show how industrialized countries can positively influence the consump-
tion level by raising the transfers to the developing world. There may be a range of 
transfer levels which is profitable for both parties. In the example we have considered, 
with CO2 and SO2 emissions, we find that a rise in the transfer level within this range 
will have different impacts, depending on the kind of SO2 regulation in China. 
Our results suggest that this type of development aid will be more effective at increas-
ing private consumption in the receptor country if its domestic environmental policy is 
implemented in a flexible and incentive compatible way. In our example, this is the 
case when China stipulates the abatement target (z), but not the level (a) of end-of-pipe 
technology application for SO2 control. CDM transfers towards developing countries 
that base their environmental regulations mainly on command-and-control instruments 
like the implementation of technological standards will likely have a lower poverty- 
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mitigating impact (in the sense of raising private consumption). As highlighted in the 
previous section, this advantage is a result of the flexibility afforded by a technology-
neutral policy; developing countries will take advantage of the co-benefits of the CDM 
by paring down their application of end-of-pipe technologies, which in turn will allow 
for more private consumption. This is in line with the preference in the literature for 
market-based  environmental  policy  (such  as  taxes  or  permits)  over  a  technology-
driven approach. 
When it comes to the impact of the transfer level on global climate protection, our 
results suggest that the higher the level of the subsidy rate the higher the global climate 
protection level under both options for domestic environmental policy. Climate protec-
tion appears to increase slightly more under the flexible regulation option, albeit with 
only a 1.5% advantage. 
Both environmental regulation scenarios offer positive welfare (u) responses to increas-
ing CDM transfer rates in our model. Yet, the CDM transfers actually caused a decline 
in private consumption if China applied a technology-specific policy.  
At first sight, the consumption and climate protection results may appear to contradict 
the assumption that positive environmental protection and poverty mitigation (via in-
creased consumption) always go hand in hand. We find that the most advantageous out-
come from a consumption perspective may not be the same as the one from a climate 
perspective.  
We  must,  however,  note  that  the  negative  consumption  impact  in  our  technology-
specific scenario occurs within a model where SO2 emission reductions are the only co-
benefit of climate policy. If we were to expand the co-benefits into additional pollutants 
(NOx, PM) and effects (such as energy cost savings and energy security) it might be the 
case that both technology-specific and technology-neutral scenarios will feature positive 
consumption impacts of increased subsidies. Energy savings, for example, will allow for 
more consumption on other goods and services. In such a case, environmental protection 
and consumption would increase simultaneously. However, what our model effectively 
demonstrates is the importance of co-benefits in environmental policy analysis and de-
sign. 
In future extensions of this work, it would be interesting to add complexity to the model  
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by including additional pollutants and ancillary effects, and by linking consumption le-
vels to pollution. Another important extension of the analysis would be the investigation 
of distributional effects within China, e.g. of the question whether the change in private 
consumption would mainly improve the well-being of the poor or of the rich in China. 
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